Multi-agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning For Certain General-sum Stochastic Games

Abstract

This paper addresses the problem of multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning (MIRL) in a two-player general-sum stochastic game framework. Five variants of MIRL are considered: uCS-MIRL, advE-MIRL, cooE-MIRL, uCE-MIRL, and uNE-MIRL, each distinguished by its solution concept. Problem uCS-MIRL is a cooperative game in which the agents employ cooperative strategies that aim to maximize the total game value. In problem uCE-MIRL, agents are assumed to follow strategies that constitute a correlated equilibrium while maximizing total game value. Problem uNE-MIRL is similar to uCE-MIRL in total game value maximization, but it is assumed that the agents are playing a Nash equilibrium. Problems advE-MIRL and cooE-MIRL assume agents are playing an adversarial equilibrium and a coordination equilibrium, respectively. We propose novel approaches to address these five problems under the assumption that the game observer either knows or is able to accurate estimate the policies and solution concep

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• arxiv keylin2018multi

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