Multi-agent Inverse Reinforcement Learning: Suboptimal Demonstrations And Alternative Solution Concepts

Abstract

Multi-agent inverse reinforcement learning (MIRL) can be used to learn reward functions from agents in social environments. To model realistic social dynamics, MIRL methods must account for suboptimal human reasoning and behavior. Traditional formalisms of game theory provide computationally tractable behavioral models, but assume agents have unrealistic cognitive capabilities. This research identifies and compares mechanisms in MIRL methods which a) handle noise, biases and heuristics in agent decision making and b) model realistic equilibrium solution concepts. MIRL research is systematically reviewed to identify solutions for these challenges. The methods and results of these studies are analyzed and compared based on factors including performance accuracy, efficiency, and descriptive quality. We found that the primary methods for handling noise, biases and heuristics in MIRL were extensions of Maximum Entropy (MaxEnt) IRL to multi-agent settings. We also found that many successful

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