Abstract

This paper studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games, with the goal of learning Nash equilibria or coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) sample-optimally. All prior results suffer from at least one of the two obstacles: the curse of multiple agents and the barrier of long horizon, regardless of the sampling protocol in use. We take a step towards settling this problem, assuming access to a flexible sampling mechanism: the generative model. Focusing on non-stationary finite-horizon Markov games, we develop a fast learning algorithm called \myalg~and an adaptive sampling scheme that leverage the optimism principle in online adversarial learning (particularly the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) method). Our algorithm learns an \(\epsilon\)-approximate CCE in a general-sum Markov game using $\( \widetilde\{O\}\bigg( \frac\{H^4 S \sum_\{i=1\}^m A_i\}\{\epsilon^2\} \bigg) \)\( samples, where \)m\( is the number of players, \)S\( indicates the number of states, \)H\( is the

Authors

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Tags

  • Multi-Agent
  • Game AI

Stats

  • citations1
  • S2 citationsβ€”
  • github stars0
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  • heat score2.26
  • arxiv keyli2022minimax

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