Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process And Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning

Abstract

In today's economy, it becomes important for Internet platforms to consider the sequential information design problem to align its long term interest with incentives of the gig service providers. This paper proposes a novel model of sequential information design, namely the Markov persuasion processes (MPPs), where a sender, with informational advantage, seeks to persuade a stream of myopic receivers to take actions that maximizes the sender's cumulative utilities in a finite horizon Markovian environment with varying prior and utility functions. Planning in MPPs thus faces the unique challenge in finding a signaling policy that is simultaneously persuasive to the myopic receivers and inducing the optimal long-term cumulative utilities of the sender. Nevertheless, in the population level where the model is known, it turns out that we can efficiently determine the optimal (resp. \(\epsilon\)-optimal) policy with finite (resp. infinite) states and outcomes, through a modified formulation

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