Stackelberg POMDP: A Reinforcement Learning Approach For Economic Design

Abstract

We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for economic design where the interaction between the environment designer and the participants is modeled as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the designer (leader) sets up the rules of the economic system, while the participants (followers) respond strategically. We integrate algorithms for determining followers' response strategies into the leader's learning environment, providing a formulation of the leader's learning problem as a POMDP that we call the Stackelberg POMDP. We prove that the optimal leader's strategy in the Stackelberg game is the optimal policy in our Stackelberg POMDP under a limited set of possible policies, establishing a connection between solving POMDPs and Stackelberg games. We solve our POMDP under a limited set of policy options via the centralized training with decentralized execution framework. For the specific case of followers that are modeled as no-regret learners, we solve an array of increasingly complex

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• arxiv keybrero2022stackelberg

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