Higher-order Uncoupled Learning Dynamics And Nash Equilibrium

Abstract

We study learnability of mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) in general finite games using higher-order replicator dynamics as well as classes of higher-order uncoupled heterogeneous dynamics. In higher-order uncoupled learning dynamics, players have no access to utilities of opponents (uncoupled) but are allowed to use auxiliary states to further process information (higher-order). We establish a link between uncoupled learning and feedback stabilization with decentralized control. Using this association, we show that for any finite game with an isolated completely mixed-strategy NE, there exist higher-order uncoupled learning dynamics that lead (locally) to that NE. We further establish the lack of universality of learning dynamics by linking learning to the control theoretic concept of simultaneous stabilization. We construct two games such that any higher-order dynamics that learn the completely mixed-strategy NE of one of these games can never learn the completely mixed-strategy

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