Simple Uncoupled No-regret Learning Dynamics For Extensive-form Correlated Equilibrium

Abstract

The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when all players seek to minimize their internal regret in a repeated normal-form game, the empirical frequency of play converges to a normal-form correlated equilibrium. Extensive-form games generalize normal-form games by modeling both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as imperfect information. Because of the sequential nature and presence of private information in the game, correlation in extensive-form games possesses significantly different properties than its counterpart in normal-form games, many of which are still open research directions. Extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as the natural extensive-form counterpart to the classical notion of correlated equilibrium in normal-form games. Compared to the l

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