Abstract

In this paper, we consider multi-agent learning via online gradient descent in a class of games called \(\lambda\)-cocoercive games, a fairly broad class of games that admits many Nash equilibria and that properly includes unconstrained strongly monotone games. We characterize the finite-time last-iterate convergence rate for joint OGD learning on \(\lambda\)-cocoercive games; further, building on this result, we develop a fully adaptive OGD learning algorithm that does not require any knowledge of problem parameter (e.g. cocoercive constant \(\lambda\)) and show, via a novel double-stopping time technique, that this adaptive algorithm achieves same finite-time last-iterate convergence rate as non-adaptive counterpart. Subsequently, we extend OGD learning to the noisy gradient feedback case and establish last-iterate convergence results -- first qualitative almost sure convergence, then quantitative finite-time convergence rates -- all under non-decreasing step-sizes. To our knowledge,

Authors

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Tags

  • Multi-Agent
  • Game AI

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  • arxiv keylin2020finite

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