Abstract

Efficiently learning equilibria with large state and action spaces in general-sum Markov games while overcoming the curse of multi-agency is a challenging problem. Recent works have attempted to solve this problem by employing independent linear function classes to approximate the marginal \(Q\)-value for each agent. However, existing sample complexity bounds under such a framework have a suboptimal dependency on the desired accuracy \(\epsilon\) or the action space. In this work, we introduce a new algorithm, Lin-Confident-FTRL, for learning coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) with local access to the simulator, i.e., one can interact with the underlying environment on the visited states. Up to a logarithmic dependence on the size of the state space, Lin-Confident-FTRL learns \(\epsilon\)-CCE with a provable optimal accuracy bound \(O(\epsilon^\{-2\})\) and gets rids of the linear dependency on the action space, while scaling polynomially with relevant problem parameters (such as the n

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Tags

  • Game AI

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