Environment Complexity And Nash Equilibria In A Sequential Social Dilemma
2024 Β· Mustafa Yasir, Andrew Howes, Vasilios Mavroudis, et al.
Abstract
Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods, while effective in zero-sum or positive-sum games, often yield suboptimal outcomes in general-sum games where cooperation is essential for achieving globally optimal outcomes. Matrix game social dilemmas, which abstract key aspects of general-sum interactions, such as cooperation, risk, and trust, fail to model the temporal and spatial dynamics characteristic of real-world scenarios. In response, our study extends matrix game social dilemmas into more complex, higher-dimensional MARL environments. We adapt a gridworld implementation of the Stag Hunt dilemma to more closely match the decision-space of a one-shot matrix game while also introducing variable environment complexity. Our findings indicate that as complexity increases, MARL agents trained in these environments converge to suboptimal strategies, consistent with the risk-dominant Nash equilibria strategies found in matrix games. Our work highlights the impact of environment com
Authors
(none)
Tags
Stats
Related papers
- Understanding The World To Solve Social Dilemmas Using Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (2023)0.00
- Cooperation Dynamics In Multi-agent Systems: Exploring Game-theoretic Scenarios With Mean-field Equilibria (2023)0.00
- Equilibrium Selection For Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning: A Unified Framework (2024)0.00
- Game Theory And Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning : From Nash Equilibria To Evolutionary Dynamics (2024)0.00
- Matrixworld: A Pursuit-evasion Platform For Safe Multi-agent Coordination And Autocurricula (2023)0.00
- Inducing Stackelberg Equilibrium Through Spatio-temporal Sequential Decision-making In Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (2023)7.50
- Breaking The Curse Of Multiagency In Robust Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning (2024)0.00
- Understanding Individual Decision-making In Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning: A Dynamical Systems Approach (2025)0.00