Symmetric Equilibrium Of Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning In Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract

We investigate the repeated prisoner's dilemma game where both players alternately use reinforcement learning to obtain their optimal memory-one strategies. We theoretically solve the simultaneous Bellman optimality equations of reinforcement learning. We find that the Win-stay Lose-shift strategy, the Grim strategy, and the strategy which always defects can form symmetric equilibrium of the mutual reinforcement learning process amongst all deterministic memory-one strategies.

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