Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning In Bayesian Stackelberg Markov Games For Adaptive Moving Target Defense

Abstract

The field of cybersecurity has mostly been a cat-and-mouse game with the discovery of new attacks leading the way. To take away an attacker's advantage of reconnaissance, researchers have proposed proactive defense methods such as Moving Target Defense (MTD). To find good movement strategies, researchers have modeled MTD as leader-follower games between the defender and a cyber-adversary. We argue that existing models are inadequate in sequential settings when there is incomplete information about a rational adversary and yield sub-optimal movement strategies. Further, while there exists an array of work on learning defense policies in sequential settings for cyber-security, they are either unpopular due to scalability issues arising out of incomplete information or tend to ignore the strategic nature of the adversary simplifying the scenario to use single-agent reinforcement learning techniques. To address these concerns, we propose (1) a unifying game-theoretic model, called the Baye

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