Fictitious Play In Markov Games With Single Controller

Abstract

Certain but important classes of strategic-form games, including zero-sum and identical-interest games, have the fictitious-play-property (FPP), i.e., beliefs formed in fictitious play dynamics always converge to a Nash equilibrium (NE) in the repeated play of these games. Such convergence results are seen as a (behavioral) justification for the game-theoretical equilibrium analysis. Markov games (MGs), also known as stochastic games, generalize the repeated play of strategic-form games to dynamic multi-state settings with Markovian state transitions. In particular, MGs are standard models for multi-agent reinforcement learning -- a reviving research area in learning and games, and their game-theoretical equilibrium analyses have also been conducted extensively. However, whether certain classes of MGs have the FPP or not (i.e., whether there is a behavioral justification for equilibrium analysis or not) remains largely elusive. In this paper, we study a new variant of fictitious play d

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