Strategic Communication Under Threat: Learning Information Trade-offs In Pursuit-evasion Games
2025 · Valerio La Gatta, Dolev Mutzari, Sarit Kraus, et al.
Abstract
Adversarial environments require agents to navigate a key strategic trade-off: acquiring information enhances situational awareness, but may simultaneously expose them to threats. To investigate this tension, we formulate a PursuitEvasion-Exposure-Concealment Game (PEEC) in which a pursuer agent must decide when to communicate in order to obtain the evader's position. Each communication reveals the pursuer's location, increasing the risk of being targeted. Both agents learn their movement policies via reinforcement learning, while the pursuer additionally learns a communication policy that balances observability and risk. We propose SHADOW (Strategic-communication Hybrid Action Decision-making under partial Observation for Warfare), a multi-headed sequential reinforcement learning framework that integrates continuous navigation control, discrete communication actions, and opponent modeling for behavior prediction. Empirical evaluations show that SHADOW pursuers achieve higher success r
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