Abstract

Reinforcement learning for multi-agent games has attracted lots of attention recently. However, given the challenge of solving Nash equilibria for large population games, existing works with guaranteed polynomial complexities either focus on variants of zero-sum and potential games, or aim at solving (coarse) correlated equilibria, or require access to simulators, or rely on certain assumptions that are hard to verify. This work proposes MF-OML (Mean-Field Occupation-Measure Learning), an online mean-field reinforcement learning algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of large population sequential symmetric games. MF-OML is the first fully polynomial multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm for provably solving Nash equilibria (up to mean-field approximation gaps that vanish as the number of players \(N\) goes to infinity) beyond variants of zero-sum and potential games. When evaluated by the cumulative deviation from Nash equilibria, the algorithm is shown to achieve

Authors

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Tags

  • Multi-Agent
  • Game AI

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  • citations2
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  • arxiv keyhu2024mf

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