Loss Aversion Fosters Coordination Among Independent Reinforcement Learners

Abstract

We study what are the factors that can accelerate the emergence of collaborative behaviours among independent selfish learning agents. We depart from the "Battle of the Exes" (BoE), a spatial repeated game from which human behavioral data has been obtained (by Hawkings and Goldstone, 2016) that we find interesting because it considers two cases: a classic game theory version, called ballistic, in which agents can only make one action/decision (equivalent to the Battle of the Sexes) and a spatial version, called dynamic, in which agents can change decision (a spatial continuous version). We model both versions of the game with independent reinforcement learning agents and we manipulate the reward function transforming it into an utility introducing "loss aversion": the reward that an agent obtains can be perceived as less valuable when compared to what the other got. We prove experimentally the introduction of loss aversion fosters cooperation by accelerating its appearance, and by maki

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