Stochastic Principal-agent Problems: Efficient Computation And Learning

Abstract

We introduce a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit information from the agent and to provide signals about her own information. The players communicate with each other and then select actions independently. Each of them receives a payoff based on the state and their joint action, and the environment transitions to a new state. The interaction continues over a finite time horizon. Both players are far-sighted, aiming to maximize their total payoffs over the time horizon. The model encompasses as special cases extensive-form games (EFGs) and stochastic games of incomplete information, partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs), as well as other forms of sequential principal-agent interactions, including Bayesian persuasion and automated mechanism design problems. We consider both the co

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