The Harder Path: Last Iterate Convergence For Uncoupled Learning In Zero-sum Games With Bandit Feedback
2026 · Côme Fiegel, Pierre Ménard, Tadashi Kozuno, et al.
Abstract
We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, the convergence of the last-iterate to a Nash equilibrium. Although the non-bandit case has been studied extensively, this setting has only been explored recently, with a bound of \(\mathcal\{O\}(T^\{-1/8\})\) on the exploitability gap. We show that, for uncoupled algorithms, guaranteeing convergence of the policy profiles to a Nash equilibrium is detrimental to the performance, with the best attainable rate being \(Ω(T^\{-1/4\})\) in contrast to the usual \(Ω(T^\{-1/2\})\) rate for convergence of the average iterates. We then propose two algorithms that achieve this optimal rate up to constant and logarithmic factors. The first algorithm leverages a straightforward trade-off between exploration and exploitation, while the second employs a regularization technique based on a two
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