Peer Prediction For Learning Agents

Abstract

Peer prediction refers to a collection of mechanisms for eliciting information from human agents when direct verification of the obtained information is unavailable. They are designed to have a game-theoretic equilibrium where everyone reveals their private information truthfully. This result holds under the assumption that agents are Bayesian and they each adopt a fixed strategy across all tasks. Human agents however are observed in many domains to exhibit learning behavior in sequential settings. In this paper, we explore the dynamics of sequential peer prediction mechanisms when participants are learning agents. We first show that the notion of no regret alone for the agents' learning algorithms cannot guarantee convergence to the truthful strategy. We then focus on a family of learning algorithms where strategy updates only depend on agents' cumulative rewards and prove that agents' strategies in the popular Correlated Agreement (CA) mechanism converge to truthful reporting when th

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• arxiv keyfeng2022peer

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