Abstract
In this note, we show that for every simple game with n players the critical threshold value is at most n/4. This verifies the conjecture of Freixas and Kurz.
On Critical Threshold Value for Simple Games
Related papers
Ranked by semantic similarity — how closely each paper's abstract matches this one (100% = near-identical topic).
- (In)Existence of Equilibria for 2-Players, 2-Values Games with Concave Valuations (2020)55% match
- A Game of Random Variables (2017)55% match
- Simple approximate equilibria in games with many players (2017)55% match
- O'Neill's Theorem for Games (2023)54% match
- Golden games (2019)54% match
- Thresholds for sensitive optimality and Blackwell optimality in stochastic games (2025)54% match
- Maximal number of mixed Nash equilibria in generic games where each player has two pure strategies (2024)54% match
- A Complete Characterization of Infinitely Repeated Two-Player Games having Computable Strategies with no Computable Best Response under Limit-of-Means Payoff (2020)54% match