Abstract
We explore the problem of explaining observations starting from a classically inconsistent theory by adopting a paraconsistent framework. We consider two expansions of the well-known Belnap--Dunn paraconsistent four-valued logic BD: BD_∘ introduces formulas of the form ∘φ (the information on φ is reliable), while BD augments the language with φ's (there is information that φ is true). We define and motivate the notions of abduction problems and explanations in BD_∘ and BD and show that they are not reducible to one another. We analyse the complexity of standard abductive reasoning tasks (solution recognition, solution existence, and relevance / necessity of hypotheses) in both logics. Finally, we show how to reduce abduction in BD_∘ and BD to abduction in classical propositional logic, thereby enabling the reuse of existing abductive reasoning procedures.