Abstract
Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection has recently gained substantial attention due to the importance of identifying out-of-domain samples in reliability and safety. Although OOD detection methods have advanced by a great deal, they are still susceptible to adversarial examples, which is a violation of their purpose. To mitigate this issue, several defenses have recently been proposed. Nevertheless, these efforts remained ineffective, as their evaluations are based on either small perturbation sizes, or weak attacks. In this work, we re-examine these defenses against an end-to-end PGD attack on in/out data with larger perturbation sizes, e.g. up to commonly used for the CIFAR-10 dataset. Surprisingly, almost all of these defenses perform worse than a random detection under the adversarial setting. Next, we aim to provide a robust OOD detection method. In an ideal defense, the training should expose the model to almost all possible adversarial perturbations, which can b