Abstract
Computer-use agents~(CUAs) have transformed large language models into persistent execution systems capable of generating, storing, and reusing artifacts like skills and memory entries. However, existing security defenses largely treat attacks as externally triggered or temporally bounded, leaving a critical gap in addressing how compromise can propagate internally through an agent's own persistent state. We reveal that malicious influence can be covertly embedded into the structural redundancies of autonomously synthesized artifacts, allowing it to survive internal state updates and bypass standard vetting mechanisms. To formalize this threat, we introduce SynChain, a self-synthesized attack paradigm utilizing persistence-aware directed supervised fine-tuning to induce agents to create poisoned yet benign-looking artifacts. To systematically evaluate this propagation, we construct CUAChain, a dataset comprising 30 benign task chains and three attack objectives. SynChain enables dormant payloads to seamlessly reactivate in future workflows as trusted context, operating entirely without new malicious exogenous inputs. Extensive experiments on OpenClaw, Codex, and Claude Code under four defense settings demonstrate that SynChain achieves high attack success and outperforms adapted baselines, proving that securing CUAs requires provenance-aware reasoning over cross-task execution trajectories.