Abstract
Adversarial attacks fool deep image classifiers by adding tiny, almost invisible noise patterns to a clean image. The standard -bounded attacks (FGSM and PGD) produce high-frequency, near-random sign patterns at the pixel level: small in , but carrying disproportionate gradient energy. We exploit this with a single-shot, training-free detector using the high-order Corbino-Castillo mimetic operators from the open-source MOLE library. No retraining, no surrogate classifier, no access to the network under attack: the verdict is a property of the input alone, computed in time. We illustrate the detector on the standard "peppers" test image: untargeted FGSM and PGD attacks at the budget flip SqueezeNet's prediction from "bell pepper" to "doormat" (FGSM) and "maraca" (PGD), and the detector separates these adversarial inputs from the clean image by - (FGSM) and - (PGD). The margin grows monotonically with the operator order , while an equal-amplitude smooth perturbation leaves the statistic within 1% of its clean value.